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          Abstract 
 
 
We present a unified analytical theory of production and capital structure of firms. It is 
extended  from  an  analytical  theory  of  production,  whose  main  result  is  an  analytical 
formula  of  variable  cost  of  production  as  a  function  of  fixed  cost  and  uncertainty. 
Problems on capital structure can be naturally incorporated into the theory on production 
from a simple observation. Debt is fixed income for investors and hence fixed cost for 
issuing  firms.  The  decision  on  capital  structure  is  part  of  the  decision  process  that 
determines the level of the fixed cost and variable cost of firms to achieve a high rate of 
return  based  on  the  understanding  of  current  and  future  market  conditions.  The  new 
theory offers a simple and parsimonious understanding to a broad range of empirical 
patterns  documented  in  the  literature.  It  reinforces  the  impression  from  other  recent 
studies that puzzles in corporate finance often result not from “imperfect market” but 
rather from “imperfect theory”. 
 





It has been about fifty years since Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed that capital 
structure of a firm is irrelevant in a perfect market. Since then, researchers have searched 
for various imperfections in the capital market. If an imperfection is identified, this type 
of imperfection would be gradually reduced over time from competition or regulation. So 
we might expect capital structures of firms will be less and less relevant and financial 
decision making becomes simpler and simpler over time.  When Modigliani and Miller 
first published their paper on the irrelevance of financial structure in a perfect market 
about fifty years ago, theories and practices in finance were relatively simple. Since then, 
problems in corporate finance, instead of getting simpler and simpler, have become more 
and more complicated. In the process, many complex financial instruments have been 
created  in  the  financial  markets.  Number  of  finance  professionals  also  increase 
tremendously in the last fifty years. Do all these mean that the financial markets get less 
perfect over time?  
 
Empirical  tests  find  that  capital  structure  of  firms  often  deviate  systematically  from 
optimal  levels.  These  are  often  attributed  to  market  imperfection.  However,  further 
investigation generally reveals that the designs of these tests are flawed (Molina, 2005). 
This  means  that  the  inconstancy  between  theory  and  market  reality  is  often  due  to 
imperfection of theory instead of imperfection of market. However, many theories on 
capital structure are still built on the assumption of imperfection in capital market or 
product market (Istaitieh and Rodrigues-Fernandez, 2005).  
 
A brief review of the concept of “imperfection” in old astronomy will shed some light to 
our discussion.  Ancient people had long observed that stars moved in perfect harmony in 
the sky. Several planets, however, moved in irregular trajectories. It was thought that this 
was caused by the imperfectness of the planets. There were many elaborate theories why 
the planets were imperfect. However, after Copernicus proposed the theory of the sun 
centered universe, the movements of planets appeared much less imperfect. Since then, 
the imperfect match between the theory and observation of planetary movements is more 
and  more  attributed  to  the  imperfection  of  theory  instead  of  the  imperfection  of  the 
reality. The process of improving the theory, through the efforts of Kepler, Newton and 
many others, turned out to be the driving force in the establishment of modern science.   
 
When  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958)  first  developed  an  analytical  theory  of  capital 
structure, they assumed that production of a firm is independent from financing decisions. 
Although later works recognized the cost of financial distress to firms, the absence of a 
structure model about various factors of a firm’s operation make it difficult to handle 
endogeneity  problems  in  empirical  testing  (Zingales,  1998;  Molina,  2005).  Empirical 
evidences  also  indicate  that  firm’s  financial  decisions  are  closely  related  to  the 
operational side of the firm and market environment (Istaitieh and Rodrigues-Fernandez, 
2005; Khanna and Tice, 2005). Therefore, it will be very helpful to develop a unified   3 
theory of production and financing of firms in which market environment is an integral 
part.  
 
In this work we present a unified analytical theory of production and capital structure of 
firms. It is a natural extension from an analytical theory of production, whose main result 
is an analytical formula of variable cost of production as a function of fixed cost and 
uncertainty. From the theory, it can be derived that high fixed cost systems are much 
more sensitive to uncertainty than low fixed cost systems. When uncertainty increases, 
the variable cost of high fixed cost systems increase much faster than that of low fixed 
cost  systems.  In  general,  higher  fixed  cost  systems  need  higher  output  volume  to 
breakeven.  At  the  same  time,  they  have  lower  variable  costs  in  production  and  earn 
higher  rates  of  return  in  large  markets.  Therefore  high  fixed  cost  systems  are  more 
competitive in large and stable markets while low fixed cost systems are more flexible in 
small and dynamic markets.  
  
Problems on capital structure can be naturally incorporated into the theory on production 
from a simple observation. Debt is fixed income for investors and hence fixed cost for 
issuing firms. The increase of debt increases the fixed cost of firms. The decision on 
capital structure is part of the decision process that determines the level of the fixed cost 
and variable cost of firms to achieve a high rate of return based on the understanding of 
current and future market conditions. The new theory, by integrating financial decisions 
into the general firm decision processes, offers a simple and parsimonious understanding 
to  a  broad  range  of  empirical  patterns  documented  in  the  literature.  This  shows  that 
“market imperfection” is not needed in understanding empirical patterns. It reinforces the 
impression from other recent studies that puzzles in corporate finance often result not 
from “imperfect market” but rather from “imperfect theory” (Molina, 2005).  
 
Capital structure of firms is one of the most active research areas in finance. Many recent 
works have offered excellent literature review about the subject, which we will not repeat 
here. The theory presented here is an update from part of Chen (2005). The paper is 
structured  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  an  analytical  theory  of  production  and 
competition. Section 3 extends the analytical results to the problem of capital structure 
from a simple observation that debt adds to fixed cost of a firm. We then show how this 
theory provides a simple and unified understanding of a broad stream of empirical results. 
Section 4 concludes.  
  
 
2. An analytical theory of production and competition.  
 
     
 
Suppose S represents economic value of a commodity, r, the expected rate of change of 
value and σ, the rate of uncertainty. Then the process of S can be represented by the 
lognormal process 
 
       (1)                                                                                   .       dz rdt
S
dS
σ + =  4 
The production of the commodity involves fixed cost, K, and variable cost, C, which is a 
function of S, the value of the commodity. If the discount rate of a firm is q, from the 
Feymann-Kac formula, (Øksendal, 1998, p. 135) the variable cost, C, as a function of S, 
satisfies the following equation 
 
with the initial condition 
 
To determine f(S), we perform a thought experiment about a project with a duration that 
is infinitesimally small. When the duration of a project is sufficiently small, it has only 
enough time to produce one unit of product. In this situation, if the fixed cost is lower 
than the value of the product, the variable cost should be the difference between the value 
of the product and the fixed cost to avoid arbitrage opportunity. If the fixed cost is higher 
than the value of the product, there should be  no extra variable cost needed for this 
product. Mathematically, the initial condition for the variable cost is the following: 
   
where S is the value of the commodity and K is the fixed cost of a project. When the 





The function N(x) is the cumulative probability distribution function for a standardized 
normal random variable. When the discount rate of the firm is equal to r, the rate of 
change of the  commodity value, formula (5) takes the same form as the well-known 
Black-Scholes (1973) formula for European call options 
 
It should be noted that the interpretations of uncertainty, σ σ σ σ differ between option model 
and project investment model. In an option model, the uncertainty is purely about the 
underlying  assets.  In  a  project,  uncertainty  is  about  the  whole  production  system,  of 
which the uncertainty of the underlying asset is only a part. For example, suppose both 
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Microsoft  and  a  small  software  company  plan  to  develop  same  type  of  application 
software based on the Windows operating system. The uncertainty of demand for this 
type of software affects both companies. At the same time, the small software company 
also  faces  uncertainty  about  the  upgrading  of  the  Windows  operating  system,  which 
affects the developers in Microsoft less as they are better informed.    
 
Suppose the volume of output during the project life is Q, which is bound by production 
capacity or market size. We assume the present value of the product to be S and variable 
cost to be C during the project life. Then the total present value of the product and the 
total cost of production are       
 





and the net present value of the project is  
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Unlike a conceptual framework, this analytical theory enables us to make quantitative 
calculation of returns of different projects under different kinds of environments. First, 
we  examine  the  relation  between  fixed  cost  and  variable  cost  at  different  levels  of 
uncertainty. For example, a product can be manufactured with two different technologies. 
One needs ten million dollars of fixed cost and the other needs one hundred million fixed 
cost.  Assume  the  other  parameters  are  unit  value  of  the  product,  to  be  one  million, 
discount  rate,  to  be  10%  and  duration  of  the  project,  to  be  twenty-five  years.  When 
uncertainty  of  the  environment  is  30%  per  year, variable  cost  for  the  low  fixed  cost 
project is 0.59 million and variable cost for the high fixed cost project is 0.14 million, 
calculated from (6). When uncertainty of the environment is 90% per year, variable cost 
for the low fixed cost project is 0.98 million and variable cost for the high fixed cost 
project is 0.94 million. In general, as fixed costs are increased, variable costs decrease 
rapidly  in  a  low  uncertainty  environment  and  decreases  slowly  in  a  high  uncertainty 
environment. This is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Next we discuss the returns of investment on different projects with respect to the volume 
of output. Continuing the example on two technologies with different fixed costs, we now 
discuss  how  the  expected  market  sizes  affect  rates  of  return.  Suppose  the  level  of 
uncertainty is 30% per year and other parameters are the same. If the market size is 100, 
(7)                                                                                          and      K CQ SQ +
(8)                                                                                            )   ln(                                   
K CQ
SQ
+  6 
the return of the low fixed cost project, calculated from (8), is 37% and the return of the 
high fixed cost project is -12%. When the market size is 400, the return of the low fixed 
cost project is 48% and the return of the high fixed cost project is 97%. Figure 2 is the 
graphic representation of (8) for different levels of fixed costs. In general, higher fixed 
cost projects need higher output volume to breakeven. At the same time, higher fixed cost 
projects, which have lower variable costs in production, earn higher rates of return in 
large markets.  
 
From the above discussion the level of fixed investment in a project depends on the 
expectation  of  the  level  of  uncertainty  of  production  technology  and  the  size  of  the 
market. When the outlook is stable and market size is large, projects with high fixed 
investment earn higher rates of return. When the outlook is uncertain or market size is 
small, projects with low fixed cost breakeven easier.  
 
Projects are undertaken by firms, which often utilize existing assets to help reduce costs 
in  producing  or  marketing  new  products.  For  example,  Microsoft  often  bundles  its 
application  software  together  with  its  Windows  operating  system.  This  effectively 
reduces the cost of marketing. In general, new products from large firms often enjoy the 
benefit of brand recognition, which reduces variable cost in marketing. At the same time, 
costs of projects are often affected by the characteristics of firms.  In general, ownership 
and management are less integrated in large firms than in small firms. Therefore, large 
firms adopt more rigorous check and balance systems for corporate control than small 
firms.  This  added  cost  of  monitoring  often  increases  the  cost  of  projects.  Therefore, 
higher fixed cost large firms generally concentrate on large and stable markets while 
lower fixed cost small firms thrive in uncertain niche markets. Firms of different sizes 
will  choose  different  types  of  markets.  For  example,  large  banks,  as  high  fixed  cost 
systems with large network of branches, concentrate on standard financial products with 
high volumes, such as the credit card business, or lending based on hard information that 
can be easily obtained from standard accounting measures. Small community banks, as 
low fixed cost systems, concentrate on small business loans based on soft information, 
which is specialized information with small market size.  DeYoung et al. (2003) and 
Berger et al. (2005) provide organizational theories to explain the differences in lending 
practices of large and small banks. But it can also be understood clearly from return 
patterns of firms of different sizes as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Firms of different sizes often adopt different competition strategies in the market. In the 
retail gasoline market, the existence of small independent firms in local markets is often 
associated with high level of price volatility while markets served only by major brands 
exhibit price stability (Eckert, 2003). In the following we will work out an example to 
explain the pricing strategies of different firms. Suppose there are two gas stations, one 
from a small independent firm and the other from a large branded firm. Each gas station 
sells 30 unit of gasoline daily and gasoline price is 1 per unit. The gas station from the 
large firm, which needs to pay license fee to the headquarter, has a fixed cost of 5 and the 
gas station from the small firm has a fixed cost of 2. We further assume the discount rate 
is 12% per year and the duration of the fixed assets of both gas stations are 15 years. If 
the usual uncertainty rate is 35%, the marginal cost for two gas stations are 0.749 and   7 
0.549 respectively, calculated from (6). If each gas station decided to start and aggressive 
price competition to increase daily volume to 50, the uncertainty rate will increase to 
55%.  From  (6),  marginal  cost  for  both  gas  stations  will  become  0.847  and  0.740 
respectively. The profit difference of the gas stations from the small independent firm 
will be  
 
    0.132 )   0.749 - 30(1 - )   0.847 1 ( 50 = −  
 
While the profit difference of the gas station from the large firm will be 
 
    -0.516 )   0.549 - 30(1 - 0.740) 1 ( 50 = −  
 
From the computation, we can see that gas station from small independent firms will 
benefit from aggressive pricing competition while large firms will not. This is why large 




3. A theory of capital structure 
 
 
The capital structure theory presented here is a direct generalization of production theory 
from a simple observation.  Since debts are fixed income instruments for investors, they 
are fixed costs for issuing firms. Therefore, cost of debt forms part of fixed cost in firm’s 
operation. The decision on capital structure is part of the decision process that determines 
the level of the fixed cost of firms. While debt can be swapped into equity, rebalancing 
capital  structure  is  costly,  especially  during  financial  distresses  when  the  need  to 
rebalance is at their greatest.  For example, when a firm is doing well, its stock price is 
high and debt ratio is low. There is little need to rebalance. When a firm is in trouble, the 
burden of debt service is heavy. But its stock price is low and issuing new shares at low 
price may be a very costly way to rebalance capital structure.  
 
From discussion in the last section, fixed cost in operation, or operating leverage, matters 
to the performance of a company. For the same reason, capital structure, or financial 
leverage, matters to the performance of a company. From Figure 1 and 2, firms will 
choose a proper combination of fixed cost and variable cost to achieve high rate of profit 
based  on  the  estimation  of  current  market  condition  and  probable  future  market 
condition. High fixed cost systems perform well in an environment of low uncertainty 
and large market size. They perform badly in an environment of high uncertainty or small 
market size. The performance of low fixed cost systems is the opposite. Besides the tax 
advantage of debt, from our theory, firms adopt financial policy to reach desired level of 
fixed cost and variable cost. In the trade-off theory, the cost of debt is essentially the cost 
of bankruptcy. In this theory, variable cost of operation is a function of fixed cost and 
uncertainty, which are affected by the debt level. So the level of debt, by affecting fixed 
cost and variable cost of operation, has much broader impact on firms than the cost of 
bankruptcy. For example, employees in high debt firms, even with low probability of   8 
bankruptcy, may be less willing to invest in firm specific skills, for there is higher chance 
of layoff to reduce cost in the future.  
 
Istaitieh  and  Rodrigues-Fernandez  (2005)  classified  studies  on  factor-product  markets 
and firm’s capital structure into three strands of literature. The first is the stakeholder 
theory  of capital structure. The second is market structure literature. The third is the 
firm’s  competitive  strategy  literature.  Each  strand  of  literature  contains  diverse  and 
complex methodologies and ideas. In the following, we will show that the new theory 
provides a unified understanding of the empirical evidences.   
 
Researches  on  stakeholder  theory  find  that  firms  producing  specialized  products, 
purchasing  a  high  proportion  of  their  inputs  from  dependent  suppliers,  depending  on 
relatively few customers for a major proportion of their sales, engaging high level of 
innovative activities or having highly specialized employees generally maintain low debt 
levels (Titman, 1984; Barton, Hill and Sundaram, 1989; Cavanaugh and Garen, 1997; 
Sarig, 1998; Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim, 2004). This is because these firms face high 
level of uncertainty in their business. Since high level of uncertainty affects high fixed 
cost systems more, these firms will maintain low level of debt to reduce the level of fixed 
cost. Skilled employees of highly leveraged firms can negotiate better contract terms than 
can  employees  of  similar  but  less  leveraged  firms,  because  more  leveraged  firms,  as 
higher fixed cost systems, are more susceptible to uncertainty from employee movement 
(Sarig,  1998).  On  the  other  hand,  firms  with  high  reputation,  which  are  of  lower 
uncertainty, can increase their debt capacity for high fixed cost systems perform well in 
low uncertainty environment.  
 
Literature on market structure shows that during downturns, more highly leveraged firms 
tend to lose market share and experience lower operating profits than do less leveraged 
competitors and highly leveraged firms that engages in R&D suffer the most (Opler and 
Titamn, 1994). This is because both leverage and R&D add to fixed cost. From Figure 2, 
higher fixed cost systems suffer more than lower fixed cost systems when market size 
shrinks in economic downturns.  When firms radically increase their leverage through an 
LBO,  they  greatly  increase  their  fixed  cost,  which  make  them  vulnerable  to  rival’s 
aggressive competition (Chevalier, 1995). 
 
The firm’s capital structure also affects its competitive strategy in the product market. 
First, leveraged firms have incentives to move aggressively to gain a strategic advantage. 
(Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988) “As firms take on more debt, they become 
motivated to pursue output strategies that raise returns in good states and lower returns in 
bad states. … firms will produce more than the … output level without debt” (Istaitieh 
and Rodrigues-Fernandez, 2005) .  A firm that increases its debt level increases its fixed 
cost.  From  Figure  2,  a  firm  with  higher  fixed  cost  earns  higher  rate  of  return  when 
revenue is high, that is, in good states, and earns lower rates of return when revenue is 
low, that is, in bad states than lower fixed cost firms. Firms with higher fixed cost also 
have greater incentive to produce more because return curve is steeper for higher fixed 
cost  firms.    Financial  instruments  are  often  applied  to  reduce  marginal  cost  by  the 
increase of fixed cost, as described in the following passage:   9 
 
A firm that has access to resources at a lower marginal cost than its competitors has a 
strategic  advantage  that  can  exploit  to  gain  a  larger  market  share  and  profits. 
Maksimoviv (1990) shows that a firm that does not have such a strategic advantage 
can create it, for a fixed initial fee, by purchasing an option to acquire a factor of 
production,  such  as  financing,  at  favorable  terms.  By  initially  negotiating  a  future 
bank-loan commitment, the firm can finance an expansion of output to meet a strategic 
contingency at more favorable terms than would be possible if the expansion had to be 
financed in the spot market. The ability to exercise the commitment enables the firm to 
threaten its rivals strategically… Firms can obtain low-interest rate loan commitments 
from  banks  and  thereby  create  incentives  for  more  aggressive  product  market 
competition (e.g., by increasing quantity.)  (Istaitieh and Rodrigues-Fernandez, 2005) 
 
Second, unleveraged rival firms have strong incentive to react aggressively to exhaust the 
leveraged firms. From Figure 2, firms with high fixed costs need high level of output to 
breakeven, and, from Figure 1, are very sensitive to the increase of market uncertainty. If 
possible, rival firms will adopt aggressive production and marketing strategies to squeeze 
the highly leveraged firms and increase market uncertainty, which hurts leveraged firms 
more than unleveraged ones. Whether leveraged firms will increase output or decrease 
output  depends  on  competitive  strength  of  different  firms  in  those  particular 
environments.  
 
Khanna and Tice (2005) provide a detailed analysis on the role of debt and operating 
efficiency  to  the  competitive  strategies  of  firms.  They  define  operating  efficiency  as 
chain-wide sales-per-square foot. Higher operating efficiency may be achieved in several 
ways. Some chains put more money on advertising, which is fixed cost, to increase sales. 
Other chains may systematically select prime location as their store sites, which generally 
have higher business volume but also higher purchasing or rental cost. Still others may 
provide  better  training  to  their  employees  with  extra  cost.  Therefore,  high  efficiency 
chains  can  be  more  precisely  understood  as  low  marginal  cost  chains  that  are  often 
achieved through higher level of fixed cost. High debt firms, as we have discussed, are 
also high fixed cost firms. So the exit of high debt- high efficiency store during recession 
can be more intuitively understood as the exit of high fixed cost, low variable cost store 
during recession, when market size shrinks.   
 
To  further  illustrate  the  competitive  dynamics  of  firms,  we  will  apply  the  theory  to 
compute  the  profit  figures  of  two  firms  with  identical  production  factors  serving  a 
common market under different competitive environments. We assume each firm has a 
fixed cost of 5, the discount rate is 12% per year and the duration of the fixed assets of 
both firms are 15 years. If the uncertainty rate is 35% and the value of each unit of 
product is 1, the marginal cost for each firm is 0.549, calculated from (6). Suppose the 
market size is 60 and each firm take 50% of the market share. From (9), the profit for 
each firm is  
 
     10 
          53 . 8 5 ) 549 . 0 1 ( 60
2
1
= − −  
 
 
The level of fixed cost of a firm can be adjusted through a change of debt level. If other 
parameters are the same, we can calculate from (9) that the optimal level of fixed cost is 
7.5, which can be achieved through higher debt level. At that level of fixed cost, the 
variable cost, according to (6), is 0.448 and the profit of the high debt firm is 
 
     
         05 . 9 5 . 7 ) 448 . 0 1 ( 60
2
1
= − −  
 
Since the high debt firm has lower variable cost than the low debt firm, it has strong 
incentive to expand its market share. At the same time, the low debt firm, fearful about 
the possible expansion by the high debt firm, may start an aggressive marketing war, 
which increases uncertainty level to 55%. We can compute the new profit figures of high 
debt and low debt firms. Assume each firm takes 50% of the market share. For the low 
debt firm, the profit figure, from (9), is  
 
        806 . 2 5 ) 740 . 0 1 ( 60
2
1
= − −  
 
 
While the profit for the high debt firm becomes  
 
 
        055 . 2 5 . 7 ) 682 . 0 1 ( 60
2
1
= − −  
 
Therefore, under intensified competition, both firms earn less and the high debt firm’s 
earning is even lower than the low debt one. The computation shows that the change of 
capital  structure  changes  the  dynamics  of  competition.  The  level  of  intensity  of 
competition is partly determined by rival firms’ capital structures. It is consistent with 
Khanna and Tice’s (2005) observation that competition is more intensive in cities with 
stores of different levels of debt level than cities with stores of homogenous debt levels.  
 
Now suppose a recession hits, the market size shrinks to 40. Assume each firm takes 50% 
of the market share. For the low debt firm, the profit figure, from (9), is  
 
        204 . 0 5 ) 740 . 0 1 ( 40
2
1
= − −  
 
 
While the profit for the high debt firm becomes    11 
 
 
        130 . 1 5 . 7 ) 682 . 0 1 ( 40
2
1
− = − −  
 
The profit for the high debt firm becomes negative. This will make it easier for the low 
debt firm to drive out high debt firm. The above computation shows that high debt firms 
are more vulnerable to intensified competition, especially during economic downturn, 
when the market size shrinks. This is another reason why the actual debt levels taken by 
firms are lower than optimal debt levels calculated from many works (Molina, 2005). It 
also explains that low debt firms, the “fat” firms, will do well in an industry downturn, 
for fatness is an important factor of fitness in lean time (Zingales, 1998). In general, there 
does not exist a universally applicable measure of fitness (Simpson, 1944; Stearns, 1992).  
The concept of fitness is conditioned on environmental constraints, which may change 
over time (Dawkins, 1999).  
 
This  theory  of  capital  structure  of  firms  can  be  extended  to  understand  the  relation 
between the “capital structure” of countries and the characteristics of their industries. If a 
country’s economic activities are heavily financed by bank loans, as in Germany, they are 
of high fixed cost. The country will be more closely associated with mature industries 
whose level of uncertainty is low. If a country’s economic activities are heavily financed 
by equity markets, as in the US, they are of low fixed cost. The country will be more 
closely associated with new industries whose level of uncertainty is high. This is indeed 
what Carlin and Mayer (2003) observed in their study.  
 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) first proposed the corporate finance theory about fifty 
years ago, the fixed costs of most economic activities have increased tremendously. A 
large portion of labor force goes through college education before starting to work, at 
great cost. Many projects cost billions of dollars to build and maintain. As high fixed cost 
systems are very sensitive to uncertainty, financial decisions, by affecting both the levels 
of fixed cost and uncertainty, become more and more important over the years.  This 
helps answer the question raised at the beginning of the paper: It is not the imperfectness 
of market but rather the increase of the fixed cost of economic activities that make the 
financial decisions more relevant over time.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
 
Current capital structure theories may be classified as the trade-off theory, the pecking 
order theory and the market timing theory (Hovakimian et al., 2004). Pecking order and 
market  timing  are  both  due  to  information  asymmetry.  The  cost  of  financial  distress 
discussed in the trade-off theory is also largely due to information asymmetry. Therefore 
these theories are not mutually exclusive. Factors discussed in these theories all play a 
part in determining financial structure. But the absence of a structure model in these   12 
theories makes it difficult to determine the relation between these factors and market 
conditions.  
 
The  theory  presented  here  is  derived  from  simple  and  universal  assumptions  and  the 
parameters in this theory have clear meaning. The analytical results derived from the 
theory  about  the  relation  among  many  factors  in  production,  financing  and  market 
environment are consistent with a broad spectrum of empirical results. This shall mitigate 
the problem of endogeneity in modeling, which is central in understanding many puzzles 
in corporate finance (Molina, 2005).  
 
While  the  simplicity  and  universality  of  the  theory  makes  it  less  likely  to  overfit 
empirical patterns, great amount of details need to be worked out for each individual 
problem. For example, qualitatively, it is easy to identify debt with fixed cost. But for 
each firm, it can be challenging to quantify the relation between the level of debt and the 
level  of  fixed  cost  in  each  case  for  different  firms  have  different  levels  of  financial 
flexibility under different kinds of market conditions. These difficult works will be left to 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Level of uncertainty and variable cost: In a low uncertainty environment, 
variable  cost  drops  sharply  as  fixed  costs  are  increased.  In  a  high  uncertainty 
environment, variable costs change little with the level of fixed cost.   
 
Figure 2. Output and return with different levels of fixed costs:  For a large fixed cost 
investment,  the  breakeven  market  size  is  higher and  the  return  curve  is  steeper.  The 
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